This paper outlines some of the implications of factor market integration for scal policy in the countries of the EU and for the EU itself. It draws particular attention to the dynamic dimensions of factor market integration, and identi es some of the many issues for further research on these topics.
Summary
This paper outlines some of the implications of factor market integration for scal policy in the countries of the EU and for the EU itself. It draws particular attention to the dynamic dimensions of factor market integration, and identi es some of the many issues for further research on these topics.
The past century has seen dramatic growth in the role of the public sector in the countries of Western Europe, both by extensive regulatory as well as scal interventions. By far the most important reason for the growth of public spending has been the increase in the level of redistributive or social insurance activities of governments. These include public pension systems and health care programs as well as a host of other policies. Tax policies also have the e ect of redistributing income among di erent groups.
European economic integration, including prospective enlargement of the EU, contributes to the freer movement of factors of production, such as labor and capital, both within the EU and between the EU and neighboring regions. Integration of factor markets a ects the distribution of income and factor movements depend on scal incentives, a ecting the bene ts and costs of redistributive policies.
The paper begins by recapitulating some of the basic principles that have emerged from the existing literature on scal competition. It then describes recent trends in international migration and capital movements. The evidence suggests that the countries of Europe are experiencing inter-regional movements of labor and capital of signi cant magnitude, but that these movements are far from instantaneous. Labor and capital markets are clearly linked across regions, but there appear to be obstacles to very rapid adjustments of labor and capital stocks, suggesting that labor and capital are mobile but imperfectly so.
The analysis of factor mobility with explicit dynamics thus o ers promise. Di erent types of stock adjustment" models of labor and capital mobility h a ve important implications for the analysis of the distributional and allocative e ects of scal policy. A formal analysis of scal competition with integrated capital markets and explicit costs of adjustment for the capital stock shows that sluggish capital adjustment creates incentives for governments to use tax policy to capture quasi-rents for their residents, even if it is impossible for any one government to impose net scal burdens on capital that is perfectly mobile in the long run.
I. Introduction
The past century has seen dramatic growth in the role of the public sector in the countries of Western Europe, both by extensive regulatory as well as scal interventions. In the scal sphere, the EU countries in recent decades have maintained public expenditures and revenues at roughly half of GDP. These expenditures partly nance the provision of classic public goods like national defense and this century has seen episodes hopefully not to be repeated in the next where a large share of public-sector spending has been devoted to defense and national security generally. But by far the most important reason for the growth of public spending has been the increase in the level of redistributive or social insurance activities of governments. These include public pension systems and health care programs whose bene ts largely accrue to the old and that entail substantial intergenerational as well as intragenerational transfers. They also involve a host of other transfers: from the employed to the unemployed, toward the less-skilled, toward students, toward families with children, toward farmers, toward workers in speci c industrial sectors such as shipbuilding or coal-mining, toward people or businesses in poor regions, and many others.
On the tax side, public expenditures have been nanced by consumption taxes, payroll taxes, taxes on personal income, and taxes on business income, implying that the burden of public expenditures broadly falls more heavily on households with higher levels of consumption, income, and wealth. But of course the tax systems of Western Europe also fall unevenly on di erent t ypes of households and businesses because of explicit and implicit distinctions between di erent t ypes of income, consumption, and wealth and because of uneven levels of enforcement, administration, and evasion. All of these features of the revenue system of Western Europe themselves entail intentional or accidental redistribution of income, as well.
No simple generalization can accurately characterize such a v ast system of publicsector policies. But it is fair to say that they re ect the outcome of a democratic policy making process that has not been prepared to accept the market-determined distribution of income in an unaltered form. The market-determined distribution of income, of course, re ects essentially the distribution of endowments and factor prices, and, even in a static world, would exhibit inequality attributable to di erences in ability, health, and other personal characteristics. Of course, the world and the distributed income are not static. The distribution of wealth, though xed at any one moment, evolves over time as a result of household consumption, saving, and bequest behavior, and the distribution of income also evolves accordingly. Moreover, factor prices change continually and often somewhat unexpectedly due to technological change, demographic change, changes in demand, and associated changes in domestic and world product prices. Just to provide one illustration, returns to labor and capital in the agricultural sector in North America and Western Europe have failed to keep pace with returns elsewhere in the economy, leading to a century-long decline in the share of labor and capital allocated to this sector. This longterm shift can obviously be attributed in large part to technological change and also to world demographic shifts. It is noteworthy that this long-term shift has been accompanied by scal and regulatory policy e orts both in North America and in Europe that have had the e ect of protecting the returns to resources in the agricultural sector. In addition to distributional consequences, of course, these policies, like many redistribution policies, have also interfered with e cient resource allocation by dulling the incentives for scarce resources to ow from less-productive to more-productive uses.
Changes in economic policy that directly or indirectly a ect factor markets and factor prices obviously a ect the distribution of income, sometimes in intended directions and sometimes not. The process of European economic integration part but not all of which i s the result of explicit steps toward liberalization of markets undertaken under the auspices of the EU is bound to have important e ects on factor markets and the distribution of income. In particular, integration of factor markets themselves a ects factor prices directly. In addition, factor mobility a ects the scal systems of countries that experience increases or decreases in population and labor forces and in the stock of capital. This paper attempts to outline some of the implications of factor market integration for scal policy in the countries of the EU and for the EU itself. It draws particular attention to the dynamic dimensions of factor market integration, and identi es some of the many issues for further research on these topics.
The paper begins, in Section II, with a concise recapitulation of some principles that have emerged from existing literature on scal competition. For the most part, this literature has tended to rely on somewhat stylized analytical frameworks built on polar assumptions about factor mobility. This analytical approach exposes fundamental issues in a transparent fashion, but strong simplifying assumptions can also be misleading. Sec-tion III describes recent trends in international migration and capital movements. The evidence suggests that the countries of Europe are experiencing inter-regional movements of labor and capital of signi cant magnitude, but that these movements are far from instantaneous. Labor and capital are clearly linked across regions, but there appear to be obstacles to very rapid adjustments of labor and capital stocks, suggesting that labor and capital are mobile but imperfectly so.
In view of the evidence on labor and capital mobility, analyses of factor mobility with explicit dynamics o er promise. Section IV discusses stock adjustment" models of labor and capital mobility and their implications for the analysis of the distributional and allocative e ects of scal policy. The discussion in Section IV draws on a formal analysis developed in the Appendix. Section V concludes with a discussion of some of the important policy issues that EU countries seem likely to face during coming decades.
II. Redistributive P olicy with Factor Mobility: Atemporal Models
Much of the economic analysis of scal competition has focused on polar cases in which factors of production are assumed either to be completely immobile or costlessly mobile. Even though analyses based on stylized assumptions can be criticized for lack o f realism, the study of polar cases is nevertheless quite helpful in obtaining clear insights into complex issues, providing important benchmarks and reference points. 1 The simplest way to begin the exploration of the implications of factor market integration is to suppose that a previously-immobile factor of production becomes costlessly mobile among a large number of small jurisdictions. The assumption of small open" jurisdictions means that the factor of production is available to each jurisdiction at an externally-xed net rate of return. As examples, one might imagine that a small locality within a large country, such as a single local school district within the United States or a single small town in Germany, suddenly faces an in nitely-elastic supply of capital. 2 If capital were perfectly immobile, a local source-based local capital tax, such a s a property tax or a corporation income tax, would reduce the net rate of return to capital by the amount of the tax. By contrast, when capital is costlessly mobile, local taxes cannot signi cantly reduce the net return to capital within the locality. 3 Despite the mobility of capital, it remains feasible for the locality to impose such a tax and to use the revenue to provide public goods and services to its residents, or even simply to transfer cash to them. However, whereas this policy would make the bene ciaries of local public services better o at the expense of local capital owners if capital were xed in supply, this is no longer the case when capital can adjust freely. Rather, the imposition of the local tax will drive capital out of the locality u n til its before-tax rate of return is su ciently high to compensate capital owners for local taxes. The out ow of capital from the locality m ust reduce the gross return to labor. Because the local capital tax distorts the allocation of capital in equilibrium, it will now be more productive in this locality than its opportunity cost to the locality, i.e., than the external net rate of return the loss of income to local workers will exceed the value of the tax revenue collected from capital taxation. Except to the degree that public expenditures have a greater value to local residents than the tax revenue used to nance them, this policy ends up lowering the welfare of local residents. 4 In other words, a small open locality can engage in redistributive policies in which it imposes scal burdens on a mobile factor of production, but its incentive t o d o so is limited or completely negated by the harm that this does to local residents. This is in striking contrast to the e ect of the same policy when the taxed factor of production is completely immobile.
To generalize this simple model slightly, suppose that there are several costlesslymobile factors of production. For example, one might imagine that the local production process uses capital k, highly-skilled labor h, and unskilled labor, and that both capital and highly-skilled labor are costlessly mobile among jurisdictions. Let fk;h denote the value of local production in a single jurisdiction, where f is strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave the strict concavity re ecting diminishing returns to low-skilled labor as it is combined with larger amounts of capital and highly-skilled labor. Let r and w h denote the net incomes that owners of capital and highly-skilled labor can earn outside of the locality, and let k and h represent the net tax burdens imposed by the locality o n e a c h of these factors, each expressed for convenience on a per-unit basis. Assuming competitive factor markets, it follows that f k k;h , k = r 1:1 f h k;h , h = w h 1:2 in equilibrium. Assuming that the net revenue collected from taxation of capital and highly-skilled labor accrues to unskilled workers either in the form of cash redistributive transfers or in the form of public goods and services of equal value, the net income of unskilled workers will be x = fk;h , f k k;hk , f h k;hh + r k + k k + h h 2 where r k represents the return to any capital with which the local unskilled workers may initially be endowed.
Although this model allows for two mobile factors of production rather than just one, its implications are essentially the same as the simpler model previously described. In discussion in this paper assumes that public expenditures provide bene ts to bene ciaries that are equal to the level of public spending itself; this would be precisely accurate in the case of pure cash redistributive transfers. To the extent that public expenditures are used in ways that produce bene ts that either exceed or fall short of their costs, this assumption should be viewed simply as a rst approximation. The reader can easily see how the results would change under alternative assumptions. particular, it is straightforward to show that the welfare of the local unskilled workers, as measured by their net income x, is maximized by setting k = h = 0. While it would be possible for the locality to raise revenue by taxing capital and highly-skilled workers, the net e ect of such a policy is to harm immobile, unskilled workers.
To i n terpret the ndings of this simple analysis, note that the scal instruments k and h re ect the net impact of all taxes and bene ts that are borne by or that accrue to capital and skilled labor, respectively, contingent on their location within the locality. Thus, for example, h would include local income taxes, local payroll taxes whether assessed against highly-skilled workers or their employers, and local consumption taxes taxes on retail sales or value-added, local excises paid by highly-skilled residents of the locality. As discussed earlier, source-based local taxes on capital or capital income enter into k . But residence-based local taxes on capital income for instance, personal income taxes on dividends, interest, and capital gains would be part of h , as highly-skilled workers who reside within the locality are taxed on their non-wage income. It is thus interesting to note that residence-based taxation of capital income can distort the spatial allocation of labor; moreover, it is the average rather than the marginal tax rate on capital income that a ects household locational incentives. 5 On the expenditure side of local scal policy cash transfers and subsidies plus the monetized value of local public goods and services the bene ts that accrue to capital and to skilled labor enter negatively into their respective tax rates.
Tax and expenditure policies that help unskilled workers when capital and highlyskilled labor are immobile harm them when these factors are mobile. On the basis of this 5 Residence-based taxation of capital income is especially likely to a ect the locational choices of high-income households, for whom non-wage income is particularly important. Just to illustrate this well-known empirical regularity with reference to the US, for the approximately 5 of US taxpayers with the highest levels of adjusted gross income in 1997, wage and salary income only amounted to approximately 57 of total AGI, whereas the comparable gure for taxpayers with average AGI levels was 83 Hollenbeck and Kahr, 1998-1999 . Note that since these gures are based on the incomes of taxpayers as reported for tax purposes, they already re ect the fact that much non-wage income is sheltered from taxation. These top-bracket taxpayers had an average level of taxable dividend, interest, and capital gains income of approximately $21,000. Residence in a locality that taxes this income thus entails an annual stream of tax liabilities of about $200 per percentage point of the average tax rate. Discounting at 5, then, a permanent move b e t ween localities whose average tax rates di er by 10 would thus result in a wealth gain or loss of about $40,000. See Wildasin 1993 for discussion of interstate di erences in average tax burdens in the US and their implications for migration incentives.
analysis, then, one might expect that an increase in the mobility of capital and highlyskilled labor would lead to some restructuring of local scal policy in ways that would move k and h closer to zero. Reforms of the revenue system, such as reductions in the progressivity of the personal income tax, reductions in corporation income tax rates, or increased reliance on user fees and charges could be part of this restructuring. Privatization of public enterprises removes the expenditures and revenues of these activities from the public-sector accounts, implying a reduction in redistributive transfers through regulated prices that embody cross-subsidization among consumers and through net scal transfers to loss-making enterprises. On the expenditure side, reductions in means-tested cash and in-kind transfers, increases in the provision of infrastructure that enhances the return to private capital, and increases in public services value by highly-skilled workers would also reduce the e ective scal burdens on mobile resources. Note that the analysis certainly does not suggest that all scal adjustment occurs solely on the tax side of the public-sector accounts; thus it is more appropriate to characterize scal adjustment to factor mobility as scal competition rather than as tax competition.
To v ary the analysis slightly, suppose that both skilled and unskilled labor as well as capital are initially immobile, and that the local government imposes taxes on capital k 0 in order to provide transfers or public services to skilled labor h 0. As an example, one might think of using corporation income tax revenues to help nance higher education, a service that is disproportionately bene cial to skilled or soon-to-be-skilled! workers. Suppose that unskilled workers are neither net scal contributors nor net scal bene ciaries, paying taxes just equal to the value of public services provided on their behalf. Thus, suppose that the local scal policy satis es k k + h h = 0 ; 3 i.e., it is purely redistributive b e t ween capital and skilled labor. When these factors of production are immobile, this policy reduces the net income of local capital owners and raises the net income of skilled workers. If, on the other hand, both of these factors are freely mobile, the policy can no longer bene t the latter at the expense of the former, since their net incomes are xed externally to the locality. Rather, the impact of the policy now is to reduce the net incomes of unskilled workers. To see this, one can use 3 to eliminate h in terms of k assuming that the locality has not chosen tax rates in excess of those that maximize total tax revenue. Using 1 and 2, one can then calculate that x = fk;h,rk,w h h+r k and hence letting d=dt k denote a total derivative, including
where the inequality follows from the assumption that t k 0 t h and from the fact that dk=dt k 0 dh=dt k . 6 Thus, whereas unskilled workers were innocent b ystanders" who were completely una ected by the locality's redistributive policy when both capital and skilled labor were immobile, they are now left holding the bag," su ering reductions in net income from redistributive policies in which they themselves do not directly participate either as contributors or as bene ciaries.
The consideration of these simple models, based on extreme polar assumptions, shows that integration of factor markets represented here by the free mobility of previouslyimmobile factors of production can have signi cant implications for redistributive scal policies. By opening up locational choice as a new margin of behavioral response, factor market integration can dramatically change the distributional e ects of scal policy. I n addition, increased factor mobility implies that scal policies entail new types of allocative ine ciencies. This is of critical importance not only for normative policy evaluation, but for understanding the political economy of scal policy.
III. Factor Mobility: Some Recent I n ternational Trends
While simple models based on polar assumptions o er great analytical advantages, they may also be misleading. In the context of European integration, it is di cult to justify a priori characterizations of capital and labor mobility in terms of extreme polar assumptions. With respect to labor mobility, language and cultural barriers are obviously important impediments to movement among some countries; by the same token, it is obvious that these impediments are not prohibitively high. Moreover, while the European countries do present non-trivial barriers to migrants from the rest of the world, migration between Europe and the rest of the world certainly does exist. The movement of nancial capital among nancial centers now e n tails only minimal intrinsic costs, but there remain important regulatory barriers to integration of nancial markets. Furthermore, foregin direct investment, the relocation of business enterprise, and the establishment of productive capacity in new locations is neither costless nor probitively costly.
A look at recent trends may be useful, taking the US case as a benchmark for comparison with European countries. To begin with, consider capital mobility. Gross ows of nancial capital are of immense magnitude; many of these ows represent o setting movements through which nancial and other institutions achieve portfolio diversi cation and protection against exchange rate and other nancial risks. 7 Net foreign investment o ws are substantially smaller than gross nancial ows, and, both for the US and for EU countries, normally amount to less than 5 of GDP. FDI ows are signi cantly smaller still: in 1996, inward foreign direct investment in the US was 1.15 of GDP, as compared with .85 of GDP in 1986. By comparison, inward FDI for the largest EU countries France, Germany, Italy, and the UK amounted to about 2 of GDP in 1996, as compared with around .9 of GDP in 1986, with substantial variation among countries. Outward FDI for the US in 1996 was 1.16 as compared with a gure of .42 in 1986; for the largest EU countries, the corresponding gures are about 1.8 for 1996 and 1.3 for 1986, again with substantial variation among countries. These gures suggest that FDI seems to be at least as important in the EU countries as for the US; they also indicate that net ows of FDI are far smaller than gross ows.
As for labor mobility, i n ternational comparisons are made somewhat di cult because of di erent systems for de ning and measuring migration. Perhaps the most important distinction is between foreign" population, i.e., residents who are non-citizens, and the foreign-born", i.e., those born in other countries, irrespective of current citizenship status. In many of the countries using the former classi cation, which includes many E U countries, people e ectively lose their immigrant status in population records once they acquire citizenship, which, in some countries, is relatively easily obtained. 8 In addition, of course, the measurement of illegal immigration is highly problematic. See Chiswick, 7 In the US in 1991, net nancial investment from abroad was approximately $90 billion 1.5 of GDP, while net nancial liabilities grew by about $38 billion .6 of GDP, for a net nancial in ow of $52 billion .8 of GDP. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1999. For 1998, net nancial investment from abroad was approximately $511 billion 6 of GDP, net nancial liabilities rose by $274 billion 3.2 of GDP, and $237 billion 2.7. The growth of these ows in relation to GDP is particularly noteworthy. Comparable data for the EU would reveal analogous increases in international nancial ows.
1988, for discussion of illegal immigration and immigration policy.
Nevertheless, broad characterizations of migration trends are possible. First, in the US, 9.3 of the population in 1996 was foreign-born, as compared to 6.2 in 1986. The foreign" population in the US is not available on an annual basis, but, as of the 1990 decennial census, it amounted to 4.7 of the population; in that year, 7.9 of the US population was foreign-born. 9 For France, the foreign population in 1996 was 6.3 of the total, down slightly from the 1986 gure 10 of 6.8; for Germany, the 1996 gure is 8.9, up from the 1986 gure of 7.4; for the UK, 3.4 of the 1996 population consisted of foreigners as against 3.2 in 1986. Of the large EU countries, Italy has the smallest share of foreign population, at 2.0 in 1996, up from .8 in 1986. These statistics, as well as those for smaller EU countries, suggest that immigrant populations for the more a uent EU countries are quite comparable in size to that in the US, and are smaller for the less-a uent. Within the EU countries, a substantial minority of the foreign population is drawn from other EU countries a share of one-third is perhaps representative, but the majority of foreigners are from non-EU countries.
For the US, annual in ows of immigrants have v aried in the range .6 1.8 million in the past decade; for Germany, the EU country that has experienced the largest recent levels of immigration, gross annual in ows have uctuated in the range .6 1.2 million during the same period, with net immigration of .1 .6 million. It is striking that Germany, with a population only one-third of that of the US, has experienced absolute levels of immigration not much below those for the US. Data on population out ows are not available for many countries, but, where data are available, they indicate that gross in ows into EU countries substantially exceed net in ows; for example, net in ows in 1995, expressed as a proportion of gross in ows, amounted to 28 for Germany 37 for Belgium, 67 for the Netherlands, and 57 for Sweden. Figures for migration among major census regions of the US show, similarly, that gross migration ows among regions greatly exceed the amount of net migration.
As is well known, fertility rates and rates of population growth have fallen substantially in the postwar period both in the US and in the EU countries. Rates of natural increase have declined and in some cases notably Germany and Italy have actually turned negative. In the US, natural increase still accounts for most population growth, but, for the past decade, immigration has been larger than natural increase as a source of population growth in the EU countries. It is fair to say, then, that migration has become a major determinant of population and labor-force trends both in North America and in the EU countries, but especially so for the latter.
In summary, the ows of capital and labor to which EU countries are increasingly exposed suggest that factor mobility is empirically important in these countries, and that it needs to be taken seriously in the evaluation of scal policy. Especially in view of the magnitudes of gross factor ows, it would be di cult to accept the stylized assertions that labor is immobile" or capital is immobile" in the EU context. Particularly when one contemplates the gradual evolution of the scal and other institutions of the modern welfare state over a period of several decades, it is obvious that the cumulative impact of sustained movements of labor and capital can be very substantial indeed. By the same token, international ows of labor and capital, espeicially net ows are su ciently small that it is equally di cult to accept the stylized assertions that labor is perfectly mobile" or capital is perfectly mobile" in the EU context. Rather, it seems that some intermediate characterization of labor and capital mobility is most appropriate.
IV. Factor Mobility and Fiscal Competition in a Dynamic Context
In considering how to extend the analysis of scal policy to take imperfect factor mobility i n to account, it is useful to recognize that the stock and composition of productive human and non-human capital within a region depends on a host of economic and demographic factors aside from interregional factor ows. Fertility, mortality, health, education, and retirement behavior all a ect the size of the e ective labor force over time. The stock of non-human capital is subject to gradual deterioration over time; ows of replacement, maintenance, and net investment can preserve and augment the stock of non-human capital. Many t ypes of economic behavior and economic policy within a region a ect the evolution of the stocks of human and non-human capital. A region that is open to factor ows has additional margins of adjustment. Like other forms of dynamic adjustment o f these stocks, the migration of labor and the ow of capital across regional boundaries is not instantaneous, but rather proceeds at a rate that re ects economic incentives, intrinsic costs of adjustment, and economic policy and institutions.
These considerations suggest that scal competition in a world of imperfect factor mobility m a y best be analyzed in an explicitly dynamic framework. Over time, businesses within any one locality h a ve to make decisions about whether to replace or maintain machines, buildings, and other capital assets that gradually depreciate. At a n y one moment in time, however, some signi cant fraction of the capital stock will be of relatively recent vintage, and immediate relocation of that part of the capital stock w ould entail the destruction of a substantial portion of its value. Simiarly, most if not all individuals can consider changing locations over the course of their lifetimes, but the cost of doing so varies over the life cycle. Every year, some young soon-to-be workers complete their education and enter the work force with little or not prior attachment to speci c employers; even younger workers" are in the process of obtaining skills and education and do not even have strong attachments to particular types of occupations. These young people also are either single, have n o c hildren, or have v ery young children. For these and other reasons, it is relatively easy for them to consider changing locations. As workers age, however, their attachments to speci c occupations, employers, and places tend to deepen, with the result that turnover and migration rates tend to fall over the life cycle see. e.g., Topel 1986 , 1991 , Topel and Ward 1992 . Thus, at any moment in time, there is a signi cant fraction of the work force for which relocation is relatively costly.
Overlapping Generations
There are several ways to model imperfect mobility of labor and capital in an explicitly dynamic context. The overlapping-generations model provides one natural framework for the analysis of labor mobility. In a simple version of that model, households might b e assumed to live for only two periods, the rst of which corresponds to youth and the second to mid-life and old age. One might then suppose that the degree of mobility o f individual workers declines over the life cycle. 11 In this setting, workers are neither completely mobile nor completely immobile, but rather di erentially mobile over time. Fiscal policies that a ect workers can then di erentially a ect workers of di erent ages, in a v ariety o f w ays.
For example, suppose that a local government imposes a general tax on wage incomes. If young workers are highly mobile, this tax may discourage entry into the locality and the before-tax wages of young workers will rise to compensate them for the burden of local scal policy. I f y oung workers are perfectly substitutable for older workers, the mobility of the former insulates the latter, as well, from the burden of a wage tax. If, on the other hand, young and old workers are not perfect substitutes, the intergenerational impact of an earnings tax may be quite di erent. For example, suppose that young and old workers are complementary inputs in the production process. Then a tax on earnings reduces the productivity and the before-tax wages of older workers by reducing the supply of young workers. Since the old are relatively immobile, they su er not only the burden of an earnings tax that they cannot escape, but the added burden of lost productivity and reduced gross wages.
This example focuses on the impacts of scal policy on young and old workers. Alternatively, one might adapt the overlapping-generations model to distinguish between workers and retirees. A large portion of welfare state" scal policy involves intergenerational transfers from those in the working part of the life cycle to those who are retired, particularly through income and payroll taxes imposed on workers or their employers and the provision of public pensions and health care for retirees. Especially in the EU countries, the aging of the population is giving rise to increased nancial stress on scal systems as the population of current bene ciaries increases in relation to the population of current contributors. Some commentators suggest that migration may play an important role in helping to restore the nancial health of EU public pension systems. 12 What are the implications of labor mobility for the intergenerational transfer systems of the EU? First, note that individual workers interact with the scal system in di erent w ays over their life cycles. They are contributors when young but bene ciaries when old; in principle, any one worker could be either a net scal contributor or a net scal bene ciary over the entire life cycle, in present-value terms. Using standard generational accounting methods see, e.g., Kotliko 1992, however, it is clear that young workers are net scal contributors under existing policies, that is, they pay more into the scal system, in presentvalue terms, than the bene ts that they receive.
If young workers are perfectly immobile, relocation o ers no escape from the burdens that the scal system imposes on them. If, on the other hand, young workers are freely mobile, the ability of the scal system of a small country to impose net burdens on them disappears. Moreover, the potential gains to the elderly from taxing the young are diminished. As owners of capital, land, natural resources, and other immobile factors of production, the old are harmed by scal burdens imposed on mobile workers. The analysis in part A suggests that the elderly would be harmed, on balance, by scal policies that impose net scal burdens on young workers. Accordingly, i t w ould be in the interest of the old to alter scal policies in a way that would undo some of the intergenerational transfers embedded in the existing structure of taxes and transfers. 13 In short, free mobility o f young workers does not in itself imply that existing programs of intergenerational transfers can e ectively redistribute income from young to old workers. On the contrary, mobility o f the young suggests that these programs are more costly and less e ective than otherwise. It should, however, be emphasized that older households in EU countries can still bene t from increased immigration of younger workers. Flows of workers into EU countries from the rest of the world raises the returns to existing stocks of resources including not only commercial and industrial but also residential capital that are predominantly owned by older EU residents. Liberalization of migration policies can increase the bene ts to the old from higher returns to non-human resources, even if it undermines their ability to extract resources from the young through scal policies.
An Adjustment-Cost Approach While a two-period overlapping generations model may provide a natural framework for describing the di erential mobility o f w orkers in di erent age groups, it shares with the atemporal modeling approach of part A above the somewhat unattractive putty-clay" feature that workers are still sharply characterized either as perfectly mobile or perfectly immobile, depending on their age. Plausibly, h o wever, the ability or willingness of workers at various ages to change locations depends not only on their age but on the magnitude of the scal and other migration incentives that they face. Consider, as an alternative, the application of standard adjustment-cost models of investment to the problem of factor mobility.
Adjustment cost models are now standard tools for the analysis of the investment behavior of rms. These are explicitly dynamic models in which the ow of output is assumed to depend on the ow of services from the stock of capital and the ow of labor services used in the production process. Capital is a stock which is gradually depleted over time due to depreciation but which can be maintained or increased through a ow o f purchases of new capital. If rms could costlessly adjust their capital stocks in response to changes in policy or other shocks, investment o ws would occur at extremely high rates in extremely short bursts: rms would simply make their capital stocks adjust instantaneously to their new desired levels. In practice, however, the process of investment occurs gradually because it is costly to add, refurbish, or replace plant and equipment. Moreover, the costs of adjusting the capital stock are likely to rise as the rate of investment rises. While it is often possible to accelerate the planning and execution of investment projects, doing so normally entails extra out-of-pocket expense, disruption of existing operations, and other costs. Increasing adjustment costs provide rms with incentives to maintain a steadier ow o f i n vestment o ver time, resulting in slower adjustment of the capital stock to new, desired levels in response to changes in scal policy or other economic conditions.
As spelled out in detail in the Appendix, the adjustment-cost model of investment can be used to study tax competition in a dynamic setting. Following the traditional assumptions of tax-competition models, suppose that individual jurisdictions are small and open with respect to the external capital market, each t h us facing a perfectly elastic supply of capital, and suppose that each can impose a source-based tax on capital located within its boundaries. In contrast to the traditional models, suppose that the capital stock within a given jurisdiction entails costs of adjustment that are increasing in the level of investment.
In this setting, a local source-based tax on capital does result, eventually, in an out ow of capital. In the long run, capital invested within the locality continues to earn the same net rate of return as elsewhere. Just as in the standard atemporal models of tax competition, owners of immobile resources are harmed, in the long run, by scal policies that redistribute resources to immobile factors by taxing capital. However, these long-run e ects do not materialize instanteously when there are adjustment costs. In the short run, the local capital stock adjusts very little in response to a tax increase because it is too costly for capital owners to make a rapid adjustment. As a result, a tax on the returns to local capital does actually harm capital owners, and can be used to raise the net incomes of local labor or other immobile factors of production.
In this model of explicit dynamic adjustment, it is not correct to describe capital either as perfectly mobile" or as perfectly immobile." In fact, the adjustment-cost model e ectively includes these polar opposites of the atemporal model as special cases. In the very long run, the response of the local capital stock t o a c hange in scal policy is precisely what the atemporal model with freely mobile capital would predict. In the very short run, the local capital stock is completely xed. Thus, depending on the time horizon, capital could be described both as perfectly mobile and as perfectly mobile. The form of the adjustment cost function dictates the speed of adjustment of the capital stock: as the costs of adjustment rise, the rate of adjustment of the capital stock falls. In the extreme case where there are no adjustment costs, adjustment is instantaneous and capital is perfectly mobile." As adjustment costs rise, the short run" becomes, e ectively, longer and longer, and the model behaves increasingly like one in which capital is perfectly immobile."
The fact that capital is not very mobile in the short run means that capital income can be a target for redistributive policy: the returns to the owners of local capital consist of quasi-rents that can be captured by local tax or other policies. While such policies do eventually reduce the net ow of income to the owners of immobile local resources, the short-run gains are discounted less than the long-run costs. If local policies are chosen in order to maximize the appropriately-discounted welfare of the owners of local immobile factors, the optimal local tax on capital is positive, not zero, as the atemporal analysis would suggest. The lower the costs of adjustment, i.e., the greater the rate at which the capital stock adjusts, the lower is the optimal rate of tax.
While it is most conventional to use adjustment-cost models to study investment i n non-human capital, they can be applied as well to analyze labor mobility. Suppose, for example, that rms can increase or decrease the number of high-skilled workers that they employ, but that they incur costs in doing so, whether implicitly or explicitly. These costs might include employee moving costs, signing bonuses, severance pay, and on-the-job training costs. Assume that highly-skilled workers earn a net income of w h on external markets. A mere reinterpretation of the previous model permits one to conclude that highly-skilled workers earn quasi-rents that could be captured or augmented by redistributive scal policies.
A somewhat more complex version of the adjustment-cost model would allow for costly dynamic adjustment with more than one variable factor of production. For example, one might suppose that the stocks of both capital and highly-skilled labor within a given local jurisdiction can be adjusted gradually over time in e ect, a dynamic version of the model developed in Section II. The formal analysis of such a model remains to be undertaken. It seems fairly clear that such an analysis would show that both capital and highly-skilled labor earn quasi-rents and that redistribution involving either or both of these factors would a ect their net returns in the short run but not in the long run. Their adjustment dynamics would normally be interdependent, however, which m a y potentially give rise to some interesting implications for redistributive policy.
V. Conclusion: Challenges for Fiscal Policy in Europe
The process of economic integration in Europe is unfolding gradually over time. Looking forward over the next half-century or so, demographic change especially the e ects of low fertility and mortality in a uent countries surrounded by l o wer-wage regions seems likely to play a crucial role in the evolution of scal policy. This section discusses several of the challenges that EU countries are likely to confront o ver this time horizon.
Migration Policy and Fiscal Policy
Let us begin with the observation that EU labor markets have been magnets for migrants. A rst question for policy is whether and by h o w m uch to impede the ow o f population into the EU countries. One might suppose, theoretically, that strict immigration controls are possible. Indeed, there was little East-West migration during the past half-century. The low levels of East-West migration during the Cold War, however, must be attributed in large part not to the anti-immigration policies of the EU countries but rather to the anti-emigration policies of the Warsaw P act countries, who exercised substantial control over their borders and went to considerable lengths to limit emigration. This experience is unlikely to be repeated. Even if they were disposed to do so, it would be quite di cult for the countries of the former Warsaw P act to re-establish the kinds of economic and police powers that would enable them to impose harsh restrictions on emigration. The EU countries, one may safely assume, will not resort to Draconian measures to limit immigration. The question, then, is not whether the EU countries will experience net immigration, but rather at what rate immigration will proceed. In terms of the dynamic model described above, policymakers may be able to a ect the adjustment cost technology" for labor, facilitating immigration and speeding up the adjustment process or impeding labor mobility and slowing it down. 14 From the welfare viewpoint, there are many advantages to liberalized migration policies. Most importantly, there are obvious e ciency gains to be realized by allowing labor to be employed productively. L o w labor productivity in regions around the EU result from many factors: low levels of private capital, low levels of public infrastructure, insecure property rights and ine ective legal institutions, including political uncertainty and the risk of violent con ict, obstacles to international trade, and low levels of human capital. While these conditions persist, real income di erentials will continue to attract labor much of it relatively low-skilled toward more productive employment in the EU. The aging of the EU labor force may accentuate the e ciency gains from migration, as retirement makes labor within the EU countries increasingly scarce.
One of the principal challenges for policy arises from the distributional impact of migration. In ows of labor from neighboring countries put downward pressure on wages in the EU countries, which harms native w orkers whose labor is substitutable with that of migrants. Within the context of highly-structured EU labor markets, reductions in real wages may occur rather slowly, during which time slackness in labor markets is likely to manifest itself in the form of unemployment. Indeed, immigration may create pressures to protect the employment and earnings of existing workers, perhaps retarding the procees of institutional change in the labor market in the short run, even as it undermines the institutions that support labor market rigidities in the long term. 15 But whether immigration contributes to lower real wages or to higher unemployment, it worsens the labor-market environment for existing workers, especially those with fewer skills.
Of course, if there are e ciency gains from inter-regional migration, gains to gainers must exceed losses to losers. Redistribution from gainers to losers in principle provides a means by which policymakers can o set any adverse distributional e ects arising from increased immigration. Appropriate compensation mechanisms are not easily devised, however. Most of the obvious forms of compensation instruments such as means-tested 15 The example of German uni cation is instructive. As explained by Sinn and Sinn 1994 and Sinn 1995 , the e orts of labor unions and policymakers have succeeded in extending high real wages into the former East Germany, simultaneously protecting the real wages of workers in the West and contributing to higher unemployment. For recent discussions of labor market institutions and the unemployment problem in the EU countries, see, e.g., Bertolo and Ichino 1995 , Burda and Mertens 1995 , Siebert 1997 , and Nickell 1997 . Sch ob and Wildasin 1998 analyze the e ciency and distributional e ects of labor market integration in a system of jurisdictions with unemployment. cash and in-kind bene ts nanced by taxes on high-income individuals and source-based capital income taxes are traditionally o ered on a residence basis to all households who qualify on the basis of income, unemployment, or other criteria. 16 If immigrants are not or cannot be excluded from social bene ts, then the attempt to compensate those who are adversely a ected by immigration will in itself increase the incentives for further immigration. Indeed, it can be shown Wildasin, 1994 that labor market integration will often not be Pareto-improving for the residents of a given jurisdiction if scal discrimination between immigrants and native residents is not feasible or is disallowed, even though aggregate income within the jurisdiction may rise.
Liberalized immigration for the EU countries is therefore likely to be a mixed blessing, bringing bene ts to some but not all existing residents. 17 Increased immigration is especially attractive if migrants are net scal contributors, bearing more in taxes than they receive in bene ts. These scal gains are eroded by providing social bene ts to immigrants, however, and increased immigration would likely increase the pressure on policymakers to limit scal expenditures that bene t migrants. By the same token, competition creates incentives for policymakers to limit the scal burdens imposed on migrants, especially those at the upper end of the income distribution, from whom more substantial scal contributions might be obtained. Similarly, limitations on the scal bene ts accorded to low-skilled, low-income migrants reduces the incentive to restrict immigration. 16 Non-discriminatory scal treatment for citizens of EU member states is guaranteed by the Treaty of Rome. Furthermore, exclusion from many t ypes of social bene ts is infeasible, even if it is legally permissible. In an interesting recent related development in the US, a M a y 1999 Supreme Court decision Saenz v. Roe holds that it is unconstitutional for individual states to delay the extension of welfare bene ts to poor residents who have recently arrived from other states, thus constraining further the potential for states to discriminate in their scal treatment of natives" and immigrants." This decision is likely to attract renewed attention to the issue of the implications of mobility of the poor for welfare policy and reform in the US; see Peterson and Rom 1990 for policy discussion and Brueckner 1998 for a recent survey of relevant theoretical and empirical literature on this subject. 17 The magnitudes of both the e ciency gains and many of the distributional e ects resulting from labor migration between neighboring countries and the EU depend on the size of interregional productivity disparities. Issues such as prospective EU enlargement bring this fact sharply into focus. As discussed by P ersson 1995 and Goodspeed 1997, it is remarkable and perhaps paradoxical that the extent of redistributive policies seems to be greater when undertaken in a region where income disparities are relatively small.
Regional Policy
The EU countries as a whole are a uent. However, some regions within the EU are relatively poor. One goal of the EU's structural funds is to promote economic development in poor regions, or to assist the residents of these regions. The CAP, which helps to maintain incomes for those in the agricultural sector, should probably also be viewed as part of the EU's regional policy. The agricultural work force in Europe has been in a gradual decline, a process that is of course associated with rural-urban migration. 18 The reallocation of labor from rural agriculture toward urban industry and services has been the result of intersectoral and interregional real-income di erentials, an adjustment process that would have proceeded more rapidly in the absence of the CAP and perhaps other policies, which has propped up incomes for workers in the rural areas of EU countries. 19 Regional policy for the EU countries, however, involves not only the regions within existing EU member states, but other neighboring regions as well the countries of eastern and southeastern Europe and of North Africa, in particular. Policies dealing with regions outside the EU are less systematized than for those within, but include trade policy, migration policy, and economic development policies. One of the main questions of regional policy in this regard is actually the issue of EU enlargement. Since EU membership entails free trade and free movement of labor and capital, it o ers substantial potential bene ts to many of the residents of new member states.
Equity considerations often gure prominently in regional policies. Rich regions typically transfer resources to poor regions, foreign aid generally ows from rich countries to poor countries, and sectoral subsidies generally ow to declining rather than to growing sectors of the economy. A perennial question is whether these policies promote reasonable economic goals or whether they simply interfere with the e cient functioning of markets. If a region is subject to adverse demographic, technological, political, economic, or other factors, is it better to expend resources in developing or simply subsidizing the region or to facilitate the ow of popuation and capital away from the region?
The impact of regional policies is critically dependent on the degree of factor mobility. Subsidies that promote investment or employment in a region may raise wages there if workers are immobile. If, on the other hand, workers are interregionally mobile, these policies will reduce the ow of labor out of the region, bene ting owners of land, natural resources, and long-lived capital, but at a cost in terms of lost opportunities for workers to move to regions where they could be more productively employed. To consider one dramatic recent example, consider the Balkan situation. Because of political and military strife, the EU countries face the dilemma of managing a signi cant n umber of displaced persons. Current policy discussions focus on the rebuilding of Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and presumably Montenegro and Serbia as well, at the conclusion of military action, in order to achieve the resettlement of Kosovars in Kosovo. Such a policy is bound to be quite costly, though necessary to restore the economic health of the region. As an alternative, one might allow o r e v en facilitate the relocation of refugees to EU countries. The people of Kosovo are clearly somewhat mobile, and one suspects that many might willingly settle elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, the ourishing trade in illegal immigrants across the Strait of Otranto even prior to the outbreak of the recent hostilities evidences the potential for migration from the Balkans, even in the absence of explicit liberalization of immigration policy in the EU.
This example highlights the policy tradeo s for the EU countries: in the absence of economic growth and prosperity in neighboring regions, migration pressure is heightened, making it more di cult to enforce immigration restrictions and exacerbating whatever di culties immigration poses for the destination countries. One way to promote economic development of poor regions is through interregional transfers, whether in the form of simple economic relief, through investment in infrastructure, or through subsidies to private investment. These transfers, however, impose scal burdens on the donor regions. As an alternative, greater integration of the markets for labor, capital, and goods and services may promote more rapid economic development of poor regions and the opportunity for mobile factors in poor regions to escape to more productive uses elsewhere. This alternative, however, may not help the owners of relatively immobile factors of production in the poor region landowners, business owners, or older or less-skilled individuals, and it entails distributional impacts that destination regions might wish to avoid, assuming, as before, that ideal compensatory redistributive policies are not feasible. Sometimes, in fact, it can be Pareto-improving for the residents of the destination region the EU countries, especially the richer ones to make scal transfers to poor regions, such as the Balkans, the countries of Eastern Europe, or the countries of North Africa. 20 The Dynamics of Political Economy: Exit and Voice A nal issue that warrants attention is the implications of factor mobility for the political economy of public policy, especially redistributive scal policies. Returning for the moment to the atemporal models of scal competition described in Section II, note that factor mobility carries potentially rather powerful implications for public choice. In a w orld where several di erent resources are immobile, the coercive p o wer of the public sector can be exploited, through the political process, to transfer rents among resource owners for examples, from owners of land in the western part of a locality to landowners in the eastern part, or from immobile rich w orkers to immobile poor workers. Each of these groups has an incentive to participate in the political process to exploit the other, and to defend itself against exploitation by the other. In the language of Hirschman 1970, each has an incentive to use voice."
But suppose now that a resource, previously immobile, becomes freely mobile. It is no longer in the interest of others in the jurisdiction to target this resource as a contributor in some redistributive mechanism, since it no longer earns rents that can be captured through scal policy. By the same token, the owners of the now-mobile resource no longer have a n incentive to participate in the local political process since, on the one hand, the bene ts of any scal transfers directed toward them would be eroded by in ows of competing resources, and, on the other hand, the burden of any transfers directed against them can be avoided by leaving Hirschman's exit" option. It is perhaps one of the paradoxes of increasing factor mobility that as politcal power becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of immobile factor owners, the value of exercising that power tends to diminish.
More generally, in a more realistic world with imperfect factor mobility, the clear-cut distinction between voice" and exit" becomes blurred. But, even in an explicitly dynamic model of factor mobility such as that discussed in Section IV, the implications of increased factor mobility seem reasonably clear. Whether brought about by c hanges in policy such as EU enlargement, relaxation of capital controls and immigration quotas, or the easing of occupational licensure and related labor market regulations or through reductions in the fundamental real costs of factor movement, greater factor mobility reduces adjustment costs and raises the speed with which stocks of factors respond to scal incentives. It also reduces the quasi-rents that owners of these factors can gain or lose through favorable or adverse manipulation of scal policies. Even as the voices" arguing for more favorable scal treatment of capital or highly-skilled young workers become less insistent, scal policy may become more and more favorable toward them. The locus of political debate may shift toward disputes among those resources that remain relatively immobile landowners in the east" and landowners in the west", owners of natural resources and the elderly, and others whose incomes are directly or indirectly tied to locationally-xed resources.
APPENDIX
This appendix presents an explicit comparative-dynamic analysis of the e ects of scal competition in a world with imperfectly-mobile capital. The imperfect mobility of capital arises because of the costs of adjustment associated with investment.
A. Model Structure
The analysis focuses on a single small jurisdiction. Within this jurisdiction, capital is combined with immobile and inelastically-supplied factors of production called labor", but also interpreted to include land, natural resources, public infrastructure, and other xed inputs to produce one or more traded goods. Assuming that the prices of traded goods are una ected by local policies, these goods may be treated as a composite commodity which is taken as num eraire. Thus, let fk t , with f 0 0 f 00 , denote output within the locality at time t, expressed as a function of the amount of capital employed within the jurisdiction at that time, k t . The strict concavity o f f re ects the presence of other, xed factors of production. Assuming that local factor markets are perfectly competitive, these factors will receive a gross income at time t equal to w t fk t , k t f 0 k t . It is assumed that these factors are owned by local residents who themselves are immobile and assumed to be identical. In order to obviate any issues relating to intergenerational transfers, these households are also assumed to be in nitely-lived or, equivalently, to be linked through altruistically-motivated intergenerational transfers.
Capital is traded in external markets, where it earns a rate of return r that is una ected by local policies and is thus taken as exogenously xed for the purposes of the analysis. It is also assumed to be time-invariant. Firms located within the locality can acquire capital at a cost of r and also must pay a local tax on capital. In order to keep the analysis of capital tax policy as simple as possible, and, in particular, to obviate issues of time consistency as well as to maintain ease of comparison with atemporal models used in previous literature, assume that the locality imposes a per-unit tax on capital at a time invariant rate of k . Thus, the tax-inclusive cost of capital to local rms is r + k .
The dynamics of the model are determined largely by adjustment costs that rms must bear when they undertake local investment; in particular, these costs will preclude instantaneous adjustment of the local capital stock. Speci cally, the cost of adjustment incurred by local rms is given by ci t k t , with c 0 0 c 00 where i t is the rate of gross investment within the locality at time t, i.e., the amount of expenditures on capital goods expressed as a proportion of the amount of capital in the locality, k t . This adjustment cost is assumed to take the form of lost output and is thus expressed in units of num eraire. Note that since c is homogeneous of degree zero in the level of investment and the total stock of capital, total adjustment costs are homogeneous of degree one in these variables. This assumption, and the assumption that adjustment costs are convex in the rate of investment, are standard ones in the investment literature. Assuming that capital depreciates at a constant exponential rate of , the evolution of the local capital stock takes the usual form: _ k = i t , k t :
The cash ow of local rms at time t is the value of their output net of adjustment costs, less investment expenditures, less tax payments, less payments for local labor, t = fk t , ci t k t , k k t , i t k t , w t :
A:2
Assume that no agents face liquidity constraints or other capital market imperfections and that all agents plan over in nite horizons. Local residents are assumed to plan their lifetime private consumption streams subject to the constraint that the present v alue of lifetime consumption is equal to the present v alue of lifetime income net of any taxes or transfers, rms maximize the present v alue of pro ts net of taxes or subsidies, and the local government m ust satisfy a budget constraint that requires the present v alue of public expenditures to be equal to the present v alue of tax revenues. Under these assumptions, rms choose the paths of investment i t and capital k t to max Z 1 0 t e ,rt dt P subject to 1, with an initially-given stock of capital k 0 = K 0 .
In addition to collecting revenues from the taxation of local capital, the local government m a y collect revenue from or provide subsidies to local residents in a lump-sum fashion and it can spend money on the provision of public goods that bene t local residents. Let T denote the present v alue of lump-sum taxes imposed on local residents; under the assumptions of the model, the precise time path of revenue ows from these taxes is unimportant. Assume that the level of provision of public goods is exogenously xed and let G denote the present v alue of public expenditures on public good provision; provided that public good provision levels are xed, their time path is unimportant. Since the stock of capital in the locality can vary over time, the amount of tax revenue collected from capital taxation can also vary, with t k k t the amount of revenue collected at time t. The local government budget constraint requires that G = T + Z 1 0 k k t e ,rt dt: A:3
Local residents derive utility from private consumption and from local public goods. The latter, however, are treated as exogenously xed, and can be ignored in the remainder of the analysis. No restrictions are placed on the role of public goods in the preference structure of households. The preferences of households over private consumption streams can also be very general; essentially all that is required is that household intertemporal utility maximization exhausts the present-value lifetime budget constraint. This basic assumption implies that the welfare of local residents is an increasing function of lifetime wealth. As already noted, households are endowed with xed supplies of labor, earning a gross return of w t = fk t , k t f 0 k t i n e v ery period. Local residents may also be endowed with some stock of capital k which earns a ow return of r k in every period, as well as some ownership shares in local and foreign rms. Let represent the local ownership share in local rms, with 0 1, and let represent the present v alue of pro ts derived from ownership of rms outside of the locality. Under these assumptions, the present v alue of lifetime income for local residents is given by In particular, assuming that the locality is initially in a steady-state equilibrium, A.8 i s a t wo-equation system with constant coe cients. To solve this system, it is convenient to reduce its dimensionality. Using A.7.1 in A.8.1 and noting that 0 1 = 1 =c 00 that is, an increase in the local tax on capital reduces the capital stock at all subsequent times. Indeed, the reduction in the capital stock is monotonic, and the magnitude of determines the rate at which the capital stock falls to its new, lower, steady-state value.
To facilitate the economic interpretation of A.11, de ne t f 0 k t =k t dk t =d k , which is the percentage change in the stock of capital, at time t, that results from an increase in the rate of capital taxation by one percent of the gross rate of return or marginal product of capital. Furthermore, de ne f 0 k 1 k 1 f 00 k 1 ; can be interpreted as the elasticity of demand for capital," i.e., it is the percentage change in k associated with a one percentage point increase in the marginal product of capital. If the production function is highly concave, the marginal productivity of capital schedule is very steep and is very small; in this case, we expect to see that tax policy has little e ect on the equilibrium level of capital. Indeed, implicit di erentiation of the steady-state condition A.7.2 shows that the proportionate change in the steady-state value of the capital stock is just equal to 1 lim t!1 t = :
In terms of this notation, A.11 and A.12 Note from A.13.2 that the rate of adjustment of the capital stock depends critically on c 00 , that is, the second derivative of the adjustment cost function. If the adjustment cost function is only mildly convex, so that c 00 is close to zero, then is a large and the adjustment to the new steady state occurs very quickly. I f c 00 is large, however, is small, and the adjustment to the steady state is slow.
The principal conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1: Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, a permanent unanticipated increase in the capital tax rate lowers the new steady-state equilibrium capital stock in proportion to the elasticity of demand for capital. The capital stock falls monotonically to its new steady-state value at a rate that depends positively on the convexity o f the adjustment cost function. In particular, with linear adjustment costs, the adjustment is instantaneous.
C. The Welfare Analysis of Fiscal Policy with Imperfect Capital Mobility
Having characterized the comparative-dynamic e ects of local capital taxes on the evolution of the capital stock, it is now possible to consider the welfare implications of capital taxation. In particular, it is of greatest interest to examine the e ect of changes in k on the welfare of local residents, as represented by their lifetime wealth Y . F or brevity, it is convenient here to restrict attention to the case where local rms are owned entirely by non-residents, i.e., = 0. Substituting from A.3 into A. where the second equality follows from A.11.1.
To i n terpret A.14, consider rst the case where k = 0, i.e., the locality initially raises no taxes from capital. In this case, the second term in the integrand of A.14 vanishes, and it is clear that dY=d k 0, that is, it is optimal for the locality to impose a positive tax on capital. The gain from doing so, however, depends on the value of the speed of adjustment of the capital stock; the larger the value of , the smaller the gain from taxing capital. Indeed, in the extreme case of linear adjustment costs, adjustment i s instantaneous, and the gain from local taxation of capital vanishes.
In view of A.12, it is obvious that local welfare is maximized by c hoosing a positive rate of taxation k on local capital such that dY=d k = 0. In fact, one can solve for the rate of capital taxation, expressed as a proportion of the gross return on capital, as k f 0 k 1 = ,1 ;
A:15 an inverse-elasticity t ype of formula in which the rate of adjustment of the capital stock, , again gures prominently.
Proposition 2: The optimal steady-state rate of taxation of local capital is inversely proportional to the speed with which the local capital stock adjusts in response to changes in the local rate of return on capital. In particular, if adjustment is instantaneous, the optimal local tax rate is zero.
This proposition is helpful in the proper interpretation of previous results from atemporal models which abstract from the dynamics of adjustment. When adjustment costs are negligible, there are no quasi-rents to extract from the owners of local capital, and no incentive for local governments, acting in the interests of their residents, to impose scal burdens on this capital. However, if it is costly to adjust the local capital stock, the owners of this capital, when net scal burdens are imposed on them, will not nd it in their interest to reduce the capital stock immediately to a level at which it again earns a competitive net rate of return. Rather, they will allow the capital stock to fall gradually until it reaches its new steady-state value. During this transition, the net rate of return is below the level that can be obtained on external markets, and the local capital tax thus transfers quasi-rents from capital owners to local residents. Thus, a small open locality, whose policies have no perceptible e ect on the net rate of return to capital on external markets, can achieve some redistribution at the expense of the owners of imperfectly mobile resources even though, in the long run, the net rate of return on local capital must return to that which can be obtained on external markets. The redistributive impact of the local capital tax, however, is dependent on the amount of quasi-rents available to be captured, which depends on the costs of adjustment. Previous literature, which abstracts from adjustment costs, in e ect assumes that the capital stock is able to adjust to changes in local scal policies without delay.
While it is true that a locality's residents can bene t from taxing imperfectly-mobile capital, the reduction in the stock of local capital does inevitably reduce the productivity of local labor, and the steady-state level of wage income is reduced by the taxation of mobile capital. Taxing imperfectly-mobile capital thus involves an intertemporal tradeo for local residents: they can enjoy the bene ts of reduced taxes for local public services, but gradually their wage income erodes, ultimately by an amount greater than the tax savings that they obtain by taxing capital. The preceding analysis has shown that the taxation of local capital is in their interest in present v alue terms, when discounted at the market rate of return. However, if the e ects of local policy are discounted at a lower rate, this intertemporal tradeo becomes less favorable. Indeed, if they are not discounted at all, so that policies are judged only by their long-run e ects, the local capital tax is actually harmful to local residents and should be avoided. This is another way t o i n terpret the ndings of previous analyses: by ignoring the transitional dynamics of adjustment t o local policies, they have in e ect focused on the long-run impacts of scal policy and, in doing so, have concluded that localities, acting in the interests of their residents, will not attempt to impose scal burdens on mobile factors of production.
